Tariffs and uncertainty put the economy at a high risk of recession
In the wake of the trade war launched by the Trump administration, Mexico’s bet on a growth model built to service the US market and on attracting nearshoring investment is looking like a double-edged sword. USMCA membership has granted Mexican exports a degree of protection from tariffs (see the exemption on section 232 tariffs on USMCA content of cars and car parts, and the 25% blanket tariff). However, the investment boom the country experienced in 2022-2023 was predicated on the assumption of long-term preferential market access to the US. Resolution of uncertainty will depend on the speed with which the USMCA review (scheduled for 2026 but likely to be brought forward) is achieved. We therefore expect private investment (21% of GDP) to contract in 2025 and only bounce back tentatively in 2026 as firms maintain a wait-and-see stance. Exports should follow a similar dynamic, and fiscal consolidation efforts should lead to a reduction in public investment. The tariff limbo will be particularly challenging for the automotive sector, the stalwart of Mexican manufacturing (one-fifth of the total) and the most regionally integrated industry, but also for metals and food products. The construction sector, meanwhile, will suffer the arrested boom in non-residential investment. Though the labour market has met the tariff shock in historically good health (unemployment at 2.5% in April 2025), we expect continued job destruction, slower wage growth and a reduction of hours worked.
Remittance flows (4% of GDP) will be stymied by the immigration crackdown and loosening labour market in the US, as well as their possible taxation. We therefore expect household consumption to slow nearly to a halt in 2025 and recover gradually in 2026. Given this recessionary context and the continued moderation of inflation, Banxico should continue cutting rates in 2026. We cautiously expect some of the trade uncertainty to have dissipated by mid-2026, which, combined with looser financial conditions, should allow a recovery to begin taking shape towards the middle of next year.
External vulnerabilities under control and a challenging return to fiscal discipline
Fiscal deficits like the one that occurred in 2024 on the back of pre-election spending sends a worrying signal for a country one downgrade away from losing its investment grade status. To improve credibility, the Sheinbaum government has set ambitious consolidation targets, seeking to bring deficits to 3% of GDP by 2027. Serious expenditure cuts have been programmed for 2025: a 34% budget reduction for the Ministry of Health and a 44% cut on defence. Infrastructure megaprojects that have weighed heavily in past years (Dos Bocas refinery, Maya train, Tehuantepec interoceanic corridor) will be completed or downscaled. Similarly, efforts are being made to boost tax collection through digitalisation. Nevertheless, we see several downside risks to the deficit reduction potential. The “Plan Mexico” industrial policy package aims to incentivise USD 277 billion in foreign investment by 2030 (geared to the automotive, aerospace, semiconductors, electronics and pharmaceutical industries), but its heavy reliance on tax incentives means it can lead to cost overshooting. Similarly, efforts to placate unpredictable American demands in securing the border and fighting drug trafficking can limit the potential for security savings. Social spending will continue to be generous, and no significant tax increases have been proposed. Pemex, the state-owned oil company, will continue to require state support to stay afloat and represents a contingent debt liability of about 6% of GDP. Overall, budget deficits will moderate, but could end up underperforming the government’s targets across several years depending on how much the subdued GDP performance lasts.
We should continue to see a gradual deepening of the current account deficit, driven mostly by a larger merchandise deficit. Reduced remittance inflows will result in a weakening of the secondary income surplus (3.5% of GDP). Though growth in net FDI inflows (1.5% of GDP) has disappointed, it does not show signs of collapsing, having been sustained mainly by profit reinvestments. The funding composition of the current account has therefore remained stable. FX reserves cover four months of imports, external debt is relatively low (26% of GDP) and its service is backed by an IMF flexible credit line arrangement (2% of GDP) up for renewal at the end of 2026.
Business climate under pressure from trade uncertainties and institutional reforms
The leftist Morena party consolidated its rule in the 2024 general elections, securing the presidency with 61% of the popular vote and a de facto supermajority in Congress. President Claudia Sheinbaum succeeds her still-influential mentor, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, and will continue implementing an agenda based on state-led economic development, reducing poverty and inequality through welfare and redistribution, and and by introducing institutional reforms. Notable among these is the constitutional amendment to elect judges by popular vote, which allowed Morena-aligned magistrates to dominate the June 2025 elections where half the seats were in play. Critics of the reform emphasise the risk of eroding Mexico’s judicial independence, which may undermine business interests if these conflict with those of public authorities, and create openings for corruption. Similarly, formerly independent regulatory agencies have been placed under the auspices of cabinet members, including the energy, telecoms and competition authorities. The state’s primary role in the energy sector (exploration, processing and distribution) will continue to be defended. The pervasiveness of crime is becoming an increasing business hazard as it often interferes with everyday operations and forces firms to incur insurance and security costs. Sheinbaum is expected to serve a full term of office, which is due to end in 2030, while all seats in the Chamber of Deputies will be up for election in 2027.
D’autres exigences probables, telles que des règles d’origine plus strictes (notamment une part plus élevée de contenu américain) et des normes du travail plus exigeantes, pourraient éroder certains des avantages comparatifs du Mexique à la marge.
The upcoming USMCA review will be key in shaping the business environment in years to come. Energy sector liberalisation is likely to be a significant area of discord. Despite some overtures to private sector involvement, Morena overall continues to support state dominance at all levels of the energy supply chain, while the US is likely to push for more openness to private foreign capital. Other likely demands such as tighter rules of origin (including higher US content) and more demanding labour standards could also erode some of Mexico’s comparative advantages. Under the “Plan Mexico” industrial policy initiative, the government has sought to introduce further nearshoring incentives (amortisation expensing and other tax breaks, national origin requirements for public procurement), but clarification and stabilisation of the US trade relationship will meaningfully restore nearshoring momentum. To gain favour with the US, we expect a reduction of the dependence on Chinese imports.